The framework of analyzing cognitive biases as adaptive error management adds to Hibbing et al.'s discussion about the relationship between individual differences in political ideology and the adaptive nature of the negativity bias in two important ways: First, the framework directly predicts the existence of the individual differences in the negativity bias and, subsequently, political ideology that Hibbing et al. struggle to reconcile with an adaptationist account. Second, the framework provides new testable predictions on the existence of contextual differences in when these differences are important and when they turn unimportant.
Only to the extent that the ratio of false negative and false positive errors in terms of expected fitness within a specific domain are constant across individuals and contexts, should biases in that domain be universally fixed (genetic noise aside). If, however, there have been systematic and evolutionarily recurrent variations across individuals and contexts, it is plausible that relevant cognitive biases evolved within a larger cognitive architecture that allows for systematic individual and contextual calibration of those biases to fit individual circumstances (see also Buss 2009; Lukaszewski & Roney 2011; Tooby & Cosmides 1990) .
With regards to resource loss, it is highly plausible that the ratio of the fitness consequences of false negative and false positive errors, respectively, would have varied considerably and systematically from individual to individual over human evolutionary history. For example, previous research consistently shows that a range of basic individual differences influence people's abilities to guard against unexpected resource loss (e.g., Petersen 2013; Sell et al. 2009; Tooby & Cosmides 1996) . Such differences would influence how different individuals trade off unexpected resource loss relative to the foregoing of resource gains. As consequence, such differences should be picked up by any calibrational mechanism designed to align the strength of the negativity bias with individual circumstances and, subsequently, have downstream effects on political ideology. If valid, evolutionarily recurrent correlates of loss exposure should, in part, predict modern political ideology. Some evidence suggests the existence of such a link. For example, lack of social support (Petersen 2013), high levels of pathogen exposure (Fincher et al. 2008 ) and chronically (versus temporarily) low levels of resources (Henningham 1996) are all factors that ancestrally would have been associated with decreased abilities to accommodate resource loss and have all been found to be associated with social conservative ideology and/or judgments.
Just as fitness consequences of different outcomes vary systematically across individuals, the probability of unexpectedly losing resources versus unknowingly foregoing gaining resources will vary across contexts. Contexts differ in their informational load either because of differences in available information or in assigned attention. In order to maximize expected fitness in specific situations, it is likely that natural selection geared the mind to not exclusively rely on base rate estimates but, rather, to dynamically update probability estimates depending on present information. Importantly, when probabilities that specific situation identifications constitute errors approach zero and one, respectively, other asymmetries related to making these errors will become increasingly unimportant. In other words: as certainty about outcomes increases, it will be adaptive to shift away from initial decision-making biases. In terms of cognitive architecture, this argument predicts the existence of mechanisms for not just calibrating individual differences in the strength of biases but also of mechanisms designed to temporarily deactivate a relevant bias in the face of informational certainty. Consistent with this argument, research suggests that -under specific circumstancespeople's political views converge independently of strong general ideologically relevant individual differences. While individual differences in ideological outlook often fuel strong political disagreement, liberals and conservatives are surprisingly likely to agree when facing certain (rather than uncertain) information about the politically-relevant events, groups or individuals facing them (see Petersen et al. 2011 Petersen et al. , 2012 Petersen & Aarøe 2013; Tetlock et al. 2013) .
This proposed notion of ideology as an individually calibrated error management system provides an important theoretical superstructure to the argument of Hibbing et al. It embeds the analysis of political ideology within an adaptationist framework that facilitates the formulation of clear predictions on the ultimate and proximate causes of ideological differences, and on the conditions under which the relationship between elevated negativity bias and political conservatism should not apply. The notion of ideology as an error management system is also normatively important. It suggests that political polarization is not inevitable: when the problems facing society are clear, conservatives and liberals are predicted to converge in the political solutions they promote. Contrary to the notion that political decision making relies mainly on rational thoughts, Hibbing et al. provide substantive evidence indicating that negativity bias is a key dimension underlying political ideology across cultures. Conservatives demonstrate a stronger preference for processing negative information compared to liberals. Here, we agree that the rational view of the political mind is too narrow, and that an affective dimension, like negativity bias, should be taken into consideration to better understand mechanisms defining political judgment. Nonetheless, for negativity bias to be used as a predictive factor for political attitudes, we argue that the authors should also consider the heterogenetic nature of negativity bias. Finally, the authors limited their levels of analyses to physiological and psychological levels. Here, we argue that extending their scope to include genetic and cultural levels would offer a more comprehensive picture of the political mind.
Limitations of the rational view of the political mind. Research has shown contradicting evidence about the popular belief that political judgment mainly concerns high-level, deliberative cognitive processes. Hibbing et al. cite many priming studies showing political judgment being influenced by seemingly irrelevant environmental stimuli, such as a messy room, disgusting odor, uncomfortable chair, church, and happy faces. Consistent with this line of research, recent studies have shown that perceived attributes of political candidates based solely on candidates' facial appearance can predict voting behaviors in both simulated and actual elections (Chiao et al. 2008; Little et al. 2007; Todorov et al. 2005 ). In our study (Chiao et al. 2008) , for example, participants were asked to judge facial pictures taken from actual congressional candidates in terms of several attributes. We found that both perceived competence and dominance predicted actual House of Representative election outcomes. Altogether, evidence consistently shows affective heuristics in political decision-making.
The heterogenetic nature of negativity bias. Hibbing et al. summarize psychological and physiological evidence showing higher negativity bias among conservatives compared with liberals. When encountering negative stimuli, conservatives are more attentive, react with stronger activity in the amygdala, have an enhanced skin conductance response, frown more, and show a stronger startle blink. Yet, this bias among conservatives does not apply to every type of negativity. In fact, the authors acknowledge "the messiness" of politics -that there are some negative situations in which liberals demonstrate greater bias compared with conservatives, such as income inequality, gun accidents, pollution, and so forth. Moreover, liberals are found to be more empathetic than conservatives (Hirsh et al. 2010) , which may contradict the notion that liberals are less sensitive to aversive situations, such as the pain and suffering of others. Consistent with this idea, we previously conducted an fMRI study (Chiao et al. 2009 ) to investigate empathy in relation to social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al. 1994), a construct reflecting social hierarchy (as opposed to egalitarian) preference and associating closely with conservative ideology. Participants were asked to view pictures of others in pain and to report how empathetic they felt toward those people. We found that high-SDO participants showed less activity in the pain matrix, including anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula, when empathizing with others' pain. Although consistent with the view that conservatives tend to be less empathic than liberals, our results somewhat contradict the negativity bias argument. Specifically, in our study, high SDO participants, who had hierarchical ideologies closer to conservative, showed less bias under a negative situation (i.e., viewing others' pain). Hence, we suggest that negative bias phenomena are not homogenous; rather negative bias seems to be domain-specific. Next steps for political scientists, then, are not only identifying the domains that may be more sensitive to liberals than conservatives (and vice versa), but also finding factors that determine such domains (e.g., tangibility of topics as mentioned by the authors).
Genes, culture, and their interaction. The authors did not narrow their levels of analyses to genetics, nor broaden them to culture. However, understanding both genetic and cultural contributions to the political mind may prove fruitful. As for genetics, although the influence of specific genes on political judgment may be small, the association between genes and negativity bias is well documented, particularly in the case of SLC6A4 gene in the serotonin-transporter-linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) (Canli & Lesch 2007; Hariri et al. 2002) .
Genetic studies show a relationship between 5-HTTLPR genotype and negativity bias, leading to heightened sensitivity to social cues, in which S-allele carriers of the short (S) allele variant of the polymorphism are found to be more sensitive to social cues than long (L) carriers. S-allele carriers, for example, show higher heartrate and blood-pressure reactivity than L-allele carriers when giving a speech to negative audiences (Way & Taylor 2011). Additionally, rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, with one Sallele (SL) show larger pupil diameters when looking at photos of high, versus low, social dominant macaques than those without an S-allele (LL) (Watson et al. 2009 ). This association between 5-HTTLPR genotype and social sensitivity may then influence political ideology in terms of hierarchical preference. In rhesus monkeys, for instance, when female monkeys were reorganized into a group of five monkeys varying in terms of 5-HTTLPR genotype, forcing the group to form a new social status hierarchy, S-allele carriers expressed the highest levels of both submission and aggression toward other members (Jarrell et al. 2008) . This pattern of behaviors is expected among high-SDO (hence, conservative) humans, as well as those living in countries high in power distance index (PDI) (Hofstede 2001) , where the inhabitants prefer hierarchical systems. Hence, genetic influence on political ideology may interact with culture. Strikingly, in human society, countries that are high in PDI scores are more likely to have a greater prevalence of 5-HTTLPR S-allele carriers (Chiao 2010) . Supporting this notion, species of rhesus monkey that have more tolerant societies with lenient hierarchy and relaxed dominance usually carry only the L-allele (Chiao 2010). However, species that are intolerant and have a strict hierarchy, including M. mulatta, carry at least one S-allele.
In sum, we argue that multilevel analysis approach covering from genetic to psychological, physiological and cultural levels would be more appropriate in analyzing the influence of negativity bias on political judgment. Abstract: Hibbing et al. contend that individual differences in political ideology can be substantially accounted for in terms of differences in a single psychological factor, namely, strength of negativity bias. We argue that, given the multidimensional structure of ideology, a better explanation of ideological variation will take into account both individual differences in negativity bias and differences in empathic concern.
In their target article, Hibbing et al. suggest that individual differences in political ideology can be traced to differences in the way in which liberals and conservatives attend to and process negative stimuli. In detail, their hypothesis is this: Compared with liberals, conservatives are more attuned to, and devote more processing resources to, negative stimuli, and it is this difference in "negativity bias" -that is, the fact that conservatives are more strongly biased toward negative stimuli than liberals are -that accounts in large measure for the divergence in political perspective between the groups. The principal appeal of the negativity bias hypothesis (NBH) is twofold. First, NBH promises to account for more of the psychological and physiological data on ideological differences than competing accounts. Second, NBH promises to account for the data at a deeper level, by identifying a causal mechanism underlying those differences. But does it? We have our doubts. The main source of our skepticism relates to the authors' use of a single, unidimensional measure of political ideology, anchored by liberalism on one end and conservatism on the other. A problem that arises with the use of this measure is that it glosses over the fact that, although some people self-identify as conservative on the basis of their views about both sociocultural issues (such as abortion and gay rights) and economic issues (such as taxation and social welfare programs), others self-identify as conservative on the basis of their views about issues in one of these domains but not the other. The distinction between domains here reflects the distinction made in the "ideology as motivated social cognition" literature between two factors underlying the liberal-conservative divide: (1) attitudes toward social change, indexed by right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1998) and (2) attitudes toward economic inequality, as measured by social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto 1999) . Attitudinally speaking, then, there seem to be two routes to conservatism, one social (rejecting change) and one economic (accepting inequality) (Jost et al. 2003 ). What's more, these attitudinal routes appear to have different motivational origins (Duckitt et al. 2002) . Negative attitudes toward social change are thought to stem from a concern to reduce threats to the prevailing social
